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This paper studies the firm size distribution arising from an endogenous
growth model of quality ladders with expanding variety. The probability dis-
tribution function of a given cohort of firms is a Poisson distribution that
converges asymptotically to a normal of log size. However, due to firm en-
try propelled by horizontal R&D, the total distribution  i.e., when the entire
population of firms is considered  is a mixture of Poisson distributions which
is systematically right skewed and exhibits a fatter upper tail than the nor-
mal distribution of log size. Our theoretical results qualitatively match the
empirical evidence found both for the cohort and the total distribution, and
which has been presented as a challenge for theory to explain. Moreover, by
obtaining a total distribution with a gradually falling variance over a long
time span, the model is able to address complementary empirical evidence
that points to a total distribution subtly evolving over time.
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1 Introduction
Empirical evidence clearly shows that the firm size distribution (FSD) is highly right-
skewed, with the skewness apparently being driven by idiosyncratic stochastic processes
of firm growth (e.g., Sutton, 1997). Although the precise shape of the distribution is a
subject of debate, empirical studies suggest that it is more right skewed (Sutton, 1997;
Cabral and Mata, 2003; Bottazzi, Cefis, Dosi, and Secchi, 2007, among many others) and
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exhibits a fatter upper tail (e.g., Axtell, 2001; Gaffeo, Gallegati, and Palestrini, 2003;
Growiec, Pammolli, Riccaboni, and Stanley, 2008) than the lognormal distribution, which
was originally used as a model for the highly skewed FSD (Gibrat, 1931).
On the theoretical side, recent papers have made an important contribution to this
literature by studying the interplay between economic growth, innovative activity and
skewed firm size distributions (Thompson, 2001; Klette and Kortum, 2004; Segerstrom,
2007), thus formally accommodating the early Schumpeterian view that linked market
structure and the pace of innovation. In these models, monopolistic competition prevails
and the underlying stochastic process of firm growth is a Poisson process of quality
ladders (vertical R&D). This process for innovation then leads to persistent heterogeneity
of size across firms along the balanced-growth path (BGP). Segerstrom (2007) shows
how a model of quality ladders without intersectoral spillovers generates a skewed FSD,
with size being proportional to firm quality. However, in this model the distribution
is (asymptotically) lognormal. Klette and Kortum (2004) build a quality-ladders model
of multi-product firms where each firm's product space is time-varying but the overall
product space is constant. Firm size, measured as the number of products per firm,
follows a logarithmic series distribution. Thompson (2001) uses a model where quality
ladders displaying intersectoral spillovers are combined with variety expansion (horizontal
R&D). A mixed Gamma distribution of firm size is derived, with size being proportional
to relative firm quality. Both the logarithmic and the mixed Gamma distributions are
more skewed and have heavier upper tails than the lognormal.1
In our paper, an alternative model of monopolistic competition that combines the
quality-ladder with the expanding-variety mechanism is considered, such that a right-
skewed, fat-tailed FSD is analytically derived from the interaction of those two mech-
anisms along the BGP. Klette and Kortum (2004), as well as Segerstrom (2007), focus
on a single direction of innovative activity and thus are not able to grasp the link be-
tween the properties of the FSD and the well-known fact that economic growth occurs
both along an extensive (introduction of new goods) and an intensive margin (increase
in good quality) (e.g., Freeman and Soete, 1997; Klepper, 1996).This shortcoming is ap-
parently overcome by Thompson (2001). However, the way horizontal entry is modelled
in his model  horizontal innovations do not change the distribution of relative quality
because, by assumption, the distribution of relative quality among entrants at any date
is identical to the distribution across existing varieties at that date  implies that there
is no direct impact of firm entry on the size distribution; indeed, it is only necessary to
take the vertical innovation process into account when deriving the FSD (for a similar
modelling approach, see Howitt, 1999).
In contrast, our paper explicitly analyses the impact of successive cohorts of firms
entering the market in the shape of the FSD, in order to capture the link between a richer
dynamic environment of innovation and market structure. As in Segerstrom (2007) (see
also, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, ch.7), there are no intersectoral spillovers in
1Along a somewhat different line, the endogenous growth R&D models by Aghion, Harris, Howitt,
and Vickers (2001) and Laincz (2009) allow for the derivation of a non-degenerate cross-section
distribution of market structures, i.e., a distribution of firm sizes as measured by market shares
within each industry, taken across all industries.
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vertical R&D and size is linear in firm quality; firm size is thus measured as technological-
knowledge stock per firm, which relates closely to production (sales) per firm. Hence the
FSD of a given cohort is a Poisson distribution that converges asymptotically to a normal
of log size (i.e., a lognormal of size). However, due to firm entry propelled by horizontal
R&D (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, ch.6), the total FSD  i.e., the FSD when the
entire population of firms is considered  is a mixture of overlapping Poisson distributions
of log size that is systematically right skewed. This feature allows us to accommodate
the empirical evidence reported by Cabral and Mata (2003) and Cabral (2007), according
to which the FSD of a given cohort is significantly right-skewed at birth but evolving
over time toward a lognormal distribution of size, whereas the total FSD is fairly stable
and skewed to the right vis-à-vis the lognormal. This evidence has been presented as a
challenge for theory to explain (Klepper and Thompson, 2006).2 Furthermore, our model
predicts a total FSD with an upper tail that is systematically fatter than in the case of
the normal distribution, which is also in accord with the empirical evidence mentioned
earlier. In particular, we show that an (inverse) power-law scaling behaviour may emerge
in the upper tail.3
In our model (potential) entrants perform either vertical R&D, by which they in-
crease the quality of an existing variety and hence substitute the incumbent (creative-
destruction effect), or horizontal R&D, by which they create a new variety (e.g., Howitt,
1999; Segerstrom, 2000). Size upon entry rises over time due to spillovers from incum-
bents to entrants in both vertical and horizontal R&D. However, firms entering along
the vertical margin are more efficient, and thus larger, than the incumbent in a given
industry, while firms entering along the horizontal margin, by benefiting from an im-
perfect imitation effect, are less efficient, and thus smaller, than the incumbent average
size across industries. Therefore, we capture in a simple manner the empirical evidence
that suggests there is significant variation in the relative efficiency of new firms (e.g.,
Audretsch, 1995; Geroski, 1995).
Due to the otherwise simple structure of our model, firm exit exists only in the vertical
direction and as part of the mechanism (creative destruction) by which monopolist size
2As their own explanation, Cabral and Mata (2003) consider the small-firms selection argument based
on a theoretical model where financing constraints are especially relevant for small young firms. How-
ever, according to the recent empirical results by Angelini and Generale (2008), financial constraints
are not the main determinant of FSD evolution, especially in financially developed economies. In a
very recent paper, Gallegati and Palestrini (2010) build a statistical model without entry that ex-
plicitly addresses Cabral and Mata's findings with respect to the FSD of a cohort of firms. Gallegati
and Palestrini give an alternative explanation based on a sample selection bias argument, according
to which a cohort of surviving firms may have a positive average rate of growth, which breaks the
assumptions needed to escape the lognormal result (in particular, the assumptions needed in order
to have an asymptotic Pareto FSD).
3Although Cabral and Mata (2003) and Cabral (2007) analyse the evidence on FSD with size measured
as employment per firm, a number of recent papers address the sensitivity of the FSD to different
measures of size (employment, sales, capital and value added). Empirical results for sales per firm
are obtained by Axtell (2001) and Gaffeo, Gallegati, and Palestrini (2003) (with respect to the tails
weight), Bottazzi, Cefis, Dosi, and Secchi (2007) (skewness) and Huynh, Jacho-Chavez, Petrunia, and
Voia (2010) (evolution of cohort FSD). The evidence is qualitatively similar to that obtained when
employment is the measure of firm size.
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grows over time in a given industry.4Thus, in order to derive the FSD, we keep track of
the quality level in an arbitrary industry, irrespective of the fact that the monopolist's
identity in that industry is changing over time. Moreover, since we focus on the symmetric
BGP equilibrium, the Poisson arrival rates are constant across industries and over time,
implying that the growth rate of size is also constant across industries and over time. One
unfortunate side effect of our approach is then that the growth rate of size (both in terms
of expected value and variance) is independent of age and size, which is a counterfactual
result (see, e.g., Klette and Kortum, 2004).
Outside the endogenous growth literature, horizontal entry plays a major role in shap-
ing the total FSD in many models. A recent paper with an entry mechanism close to
ours is Luttmer (2007). The author emphasises horizontal entry by linking the expected
productivity and size of a potential entrant to the productivity and size of incumbents,
such that the size of entrants is a constant fraction of the average size of incumbents.
Luttmer studies a dynamic monopolistic-competitive model of entry and exit, where in-
cumbent firms become more productive at an idiosyncratic exogenous stochastic rate,
while potential entrants can pay an entry cost to select a random incumbent firm and
then  due to imperfect imitation  adopt a scaled-down version of its technology. A
stationary FSD is analytically derived with support given by relative productivity per
firm and with a Pareto upper tail, which is fatter than the lognormal upper tail.5
Horizontal entry is pivotal in generating an asymmetric fat-tailed FSD in yet a different
strand of the literature, dedicated to studying statistical models of firm dynamics.6 For
example, Growiec, Pammolli, Riccaboni, and Stanley (2008) develop a statistical model
where the FSD is a lognormal distribution multiplied by a stretching factor which
increases with the number of firms entering the market; the FSD is then shown to have
a Pareto upper tail. For a very small number of firms, the stretching factor becomes
negligible and the distribution is close to a lognormal. In turn, the submarkets model
by Klepper and Thompson (2006) predicts that, in the steady state, for firms of any
age, the distribution of the number of submarkets in which they participate is Poisson,
but the mean is strictly increasing in age. There is also a corresponding steady-state
distribution of the sizes of these firms, such that the distribution of firms of a given age
is positively skewed and has a Poisson upper tail. The older the cohort, the greater
the mean and variance and the smaller the skewness of the corresponding FSD. These
predicted properties of the FSD are similar to those in our model and (qualitatively)
match those found by Cabral and Mata (2003) for the FSD of a cohort of firms.
We derive a total FSD that is not stationary, since its average and variance are not
constant over time.This contrasts with the steady-state distributions derived in the lit-
erature (e.g., Thompson, 2001; Klette and Kortum, 2004; Klepper and Thompson, 2006;
4In fact, differently from the standard expanding-variety literature, we allow for entry as well as exit
also along the horizontal direction. However, the structure of the model and, in particular, the
assumption of an R&D lab-equipment specification, imply that positive (net) entry prevails along
the BGP.
5Recent economic models in the same line are developed by Gabler and Licandro (2008) and Poschke
(2009).
6See de Wit (2005) for an extensive literature review of statistical models of firm dynamics.
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Luttmer, 2007, and many others). Our result for the average of firm (log) size, whose
positive growth along the BGP reflects the endogenous growth of quality in our model,
is in accordance with the empirical evidence for firm size measured as sales per firm
(e.g., Jovanovic, 1993).7 On the other hand, the variance of the distribution displays
an inverted-U behaviour over time. In fact, our results show that when the number of
cohorts is still relatively small, the variance increases over time; however, the number
of cohorts has a dampening effect on the behaviour of the variance, such that, above a
certain threshold, the variance slowly decreases as the number of cohorts becomes larger.
A fall in the variance of (log) size  measured as employment or sales per firm  over
time is in line with the evidence reported by Castro and Clementi (2009), who analyse
the same database as Cabral and Mata (2003), for the period 1980-2005.
Moreover, if we consider the variance adjusted by the average firm size and compute
the coefficient of variation, we find a monotonically decreasing time path whatever the
number of cohorts. Thus, it is clear that our FSD is not stationary, even if we consider
normalised firm sizes.8 To sum up, although we are able to obtain a rather stable total
FSD in terms of skewness and upper-tail weight, in line with the empirical evidence
presented by Cabral and Mata (2003) and others, our theoretical result is also able to
address complementary empirical evidence that points to a FSD subtly evolving over
time, as shown by Castro and Clementi (2009).
The fact that the FSD is derived within a general equilibrium model of endogenous
growth allows us to derive interesting policy implications. Since the properties of the FSD
can be directly related to the underlying firm dynamics arising from systematic innovative
activity, we are able to study the effect of R&D subsidies and other forms of industrial
policy on economic growth and on market structure, e.g., measured by concentration. In
particular, our model allows us to study separately the effects of subsidies to vertical and
horizontal R&D. In the literature, the importance of distinguishing between subsidies has
been emphasised by Peretto (1998), although in quite a different analytical setup that
analyses an equilibrium which is symmetric with respect to firm size; hence, concentration
is trivially measured as the reciprocal of the number of firms. Laincz (2009) studies the
impact of R&D subsidies on concentration within a model where firms are heterogeneous
with respect to size; however, only vertical R&D is considered and the distribution of
firm size is in fact a distribution of market structures (see fn. 1). Finally, Thompson
(2001) performs comparative statics by focusing on changes in the parameters related to
both vertical and horizontal R&D and the analysis of size distribution is akin to ours;
however, the author does not explicitly address the effect of R&D subsidies on growth
and concentration.
Our comparative-statics results depend upon the source of the change in the general
equilibrium, such that the effect of R&D subsidies and targeted industrial policies is either
growth- and concentration-enhancing or growth-neutral and concentration-reducing. In
7In contrast, Thompson (2001) predicts that firm size, measured as sales per firm, is stationary along
the BGP.
8The focus on normalised firm size  i.e., firm size divided by its average  in order to analyse the shape
of the steady-state FSD when size is non-stationary has been conducted by, e.g., Rossi-Hansberg and
Wright (2007).
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general, our predictions confirm the qualitative results in the papers cited above, while
extending them to a framework where vertical and horizontal R&D explicitly interact in
order to produce a non-degenerate FSD.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure. In the next two sections, we
present the model, giving a detailed account of the production, price and R&D decisions,
and derive the dynamic general equilibrium and the BGP. In Section 4, we analyse the
FSD that results from the interaction between the expanding variety and the quality-
ladders mechanism along the BGP. In Section 5, we focus on the impact of policy, namely
R&D subsidies, on economic growth and market structure. Section 6 presents some
concluding remarks.
2 Model
We explore a dynamic general equilibrium model of a closed economy where a single
competitively-produced final good can be used in consumption, production of interme-
diate goods, and R&D. The final good is produced by a (large) number of firms each
using labour and a continuum of intermediate inputs indexed by ω ∈ [0, N ]. The econ-
omy is populated by fixed infinitely-lived households who inelastically supply labour to
final-good firms. In turn, families make consumption decisions and invest in firms' equity.
Potential entrants can devote resources either to horizontal or to vertical R&D. Hori-
zontal R&D increases the number of intermediate-good industries N , while vertical R&D
increases the quality of the good of an existing industry, indexed by j(ω). Quality level
j(ω) translates into productivity of the final producer from using the good produced by
industry ω, λj(ω), where λ > 1 is a parameter measuring the size of each quality upgrade.
By improving on the current best quality j, a successful R&D firm will introduce the
leading-edge quality j(ω) + 1 and hence render inefficient the existing input supplied by
the producer of ω. Therefore, the successful innovator will become a monopolist in ω.
However, this monopoly is temporary, because a new successful innovator will eventually
substitute the incumbent.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a fixed number of infinitely-lived households who con-
sume and collect income from investments in financial assets (equity) and from labour.
Households inelastically supply labour to final-good firms; thus, total labour supply, L,
is exogenous and constant. We assume consumers have perfect foresight concerning the
aggregate rate of technological change over time,9 and choose the path of final-good
aggregate consumption {C(t), t ≥ 0} to maximise the discounted lifetime utility
U =
ˆ ∞
0
(
C(t)1−θ − 1
1− θ
)
e−ρtdt, (1)
9As we will see below, the uncertainty in R&D at the industry level creates jumpiness in microeconomic
outcomes. However, as the probabilities of successful R&D across industries are independent and
there is a continuum of industries, this jumpiness is not transmitted to macroeconomic variables.
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where ρ > 0 is the subjective discount rate and θ > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, subject to the flow budget constraint
a˙(t) = r(t) · a(t) + w(t) · L− C(t), (2)
where a denotes households' real financial assets holdings, r the equilibrium market
real interest rate and w the real labour wage. The initial level of wealth a(0) is given,
whereas the non-Ponzi games condition limt→∞a(t)e−
´ t
0 r(s)ds ≥ 0 holds. The optimal
path of consumption satisfies the well-known differential Euler equation
C˙(t)
C(t)
=
1
θ
(r(t)− ρ) , (3)
as well as the transversality condition lim
t→∞e
−ρtC(t)−θa(t) = 0.
2.2 Production and price decisions
The final-good firm has a constant-returns-to-scale technology using labour and a contin-
uum of intermediate goods with measure N(t), changing over time t, which is well-known
from Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, ch. 6 and ch. 7)
Y (t) = L1−α ·
ˆ N(t)
0
(
λj(ω,t) ·X(ω, t)
)α
dω, 0 < α < 1, λ > 1, (4)
where L is the labour input and 1−α is the labour share in production, and λj(ω,t)·X(ω, t)
is the input of intermediate good ω measured in efficiency units at time t.10That is,
we integrate the final-producer technology that is considered in variety-expansion and
quality-ladders models (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, ch.6 and ch. 7, respectively).
Final producers are price-takers in all the markets in which they participate. They
take wages, w(t), and input prices P (ω, t) as given and sell their output at a price equal
to unity. From the profit maximisation conditions, we determine the aggregate demand
of intermediate good ω as
X(ω, t) = L ·
(
λαj(ω,t) · α
P (ω, t)
) 1
1−α
, ω ∈ [0, N(t)]. (5)
The intermediate-good sector consists of a continuum N(t) of industries. There is
monopolistic competition if we consider the whole sector: the monopolist in industry ω
fixes the price P (ω, t) but faces the isoelastic demand curve (5). We assume that the
intermediate good is non-durable and entails a unit marginal cost of production, in terms
of the final good, whose price is taken as given. The profit maximising price in industry
10In equilibrium, only the top quality of each ω is produced and used; thus, X(j, ω, t) = X(ω, t).
Henceforth, we only use all arguments (j, ω, t) if they are useful for expositional convenience.
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ω is a constant markup over marginal cost P (ω, t) ≡ P = 1/α > 1,11 which implies the
aggregate quantity produced of ω
X(ω, t) = L ·
(
λαj(ω,t) · α2
) 1
1−α
. (6)
Using the results above we get the profit accrued by the monopolist in ω
pi(ω, t) = p˜i · L · λ α1−α j(ω,t), (7)
where p˜i ≡ (1/α− 1) · α 21−α .
Substituting (6) in (4) yields the aggregate output
Y (t) = α
2α
1−α · L ·Q(t), (8)
where
Q(t) =
ˆ N(t)
0
λ
α
1−α j(ω,t)dω (9)
is the intermediate-input aggregate quality index, which measures the technological-
knowledge level of the economy, since, by assumption, there are no intersectoral spillovers.
Total resources devoted to intermediate input production are also a linear function of
Q(t)
X(t) =
ˆ N(t)
0
X(ω, t)dω = α
2
1−α · L ·Q(t), (10)
as are total profits
Π(t) =
ˆ N(t)
0
pi(ω, t)dω = p˜i · L ·Q(t). (11)
2.3 R&D
We take the simplifying assumptions that both vertical and horizontal R&D are per-
formed by (potential) entrants, and that successful R&D leads to the set-up of a new
firm in either an existing or in a new industry (e.g., Howitt, 1999; Segerstrom, 2000).
Moreover, there is perfect competition among entrants and free entry in R&D business.
As in the standard model of quality ladders, vertical R&D constitutes the search for
new designs that lead to a higher quality of existing intermediate goods. Each new design
is granted a patent and thus a successful innovator retains exclusive rights over the use
of his/her good. By improving on the current top quality level j(ω, t), a successful R&D
firm earns monopoly profits from selling the leading-edge input of j(ω, t) + 1 quality to
final-good firms. A successful innovation will instantaneously increase the quality index
11We assume that 1/α < λ; i.e., if 1/α is the price of the top quality, the price of the next lowest grade,
1/(αλ), is less than the unit marginal cost. In this case, lower grades are unable to provide any
effective competition, and the top-quality producer can charge the unconstrained monopoly price.
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in ω from q(ω, t) = q(j) ≡ λ α1−α j(ω,t) to q+(ω, t) = q(j+1) = λ α1−α q(ω, t). In equilibrium,
lower qualities of ω are priced out of business.
Let Ii (j) denote the Poisson arrival rate of vertical innovations (vertical-innovation
rate) by potential entrant i in industry ω when the highest quality is j. Rate Ii (j) is
independently distributed across firms, across industries and over time, and depends
on the flow of resources Rvi (j) committed by entrants at time t. As in, e.g., Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (2004, ch. 7), Ii (j) features constant returns in R&D expenditures,
Ii (j) = Rvi (j) ·Ψ (j), where Ψ (j) is the R&D productivity factor, which is assumed to
be homogeneous across i in ω. We assume
Ψ(j) =
1
ζ · L · q(j + 1) (12)
where ζ > 0 is a constant flow fixed cost. With (12), we wish to capture the idea that the
larger the scale of expected production of a firm, L·q(j+1), is (see (6)), the larger the costs
necessary to discover and develop the associated technology will be: e.g., construction of
prototypes and samples, new assembly lines and training of workers. These assumptions
guarantee that spending in R&D increases at the same rate as output, delivering a BGP
without scale effects, in line with the last generation of quality-ladders models (e.g., Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).12Also, differently from Howitt (1999) and others, we assume
that there are no intersectoral spillovers in vertical R&D (e.g., Segerstrom, 2007; Etro,
2008). Aggregating across i in ω, we get Rv (j) =
∑
iRvi (j) and I (j) =
∑
i Ii (j), and
thus
I(j) = Rv(j) · 1
ζ · L · q(j + 1) (13)
As the terminal date of each monopoly arrives as a Poisson process with frequency
I (j) per (infinitesimal) increment of time, the present value of a monopolist's profits is a
random variable. Let V (j) denote the expected value of an incumbent firm with current
quality level j(ω, t),13such that V (j) = pi(j)
´∞
t e
− ´ st (r(v)+I(j(v)))dvds, where pi(j), given
by (7), is constant in-between innovations. We antecipate that, along the BGP, r and I
are constants; hence, we can further write
V (j) =
pi(j)
r + I(j)
. (14)
On the other hand, free-entry prevails in vertical R&D such that the condition I(j) ·
V (j + 1) = Rv (j) holds, which implies that
V (j + 1) =
1
Ψ (j)
= ζ · L · q(j + 1). (15)
12Moreover, the increasing difficulty in creating new qualities over t due to the growth in j exactly
offsets the increasing rewards from marketing higher qualities  see (12) and (7). As shown below,
this allows for a constant Poisson rate along the BGP.
13We assume that entrants are risk-neutral and, thus, only care about the expected value of the firm.
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By substituting (14) into (15) and using (7) to simplify, we get the arbitrage equation
facing a vertical innovator
r =
p˜i
ζ
− I (16)
According to (16), the rates of entry are symmetric across industries, I(j) = I.
Variety expansion arises from R&D aimed at creating a new intermediate good. Again,
innovation is performed by a potential entrant, which means that, because there is free
entry, the new good is produced by a new firm. Under perfect competition among R&D
firms and constant returns to scale at the firm level, instantaneous entry is obtained as
.
N e(t) = 1ηRne (t), where
.
N e(t) is the contribution to the instantaneous flow of the new
good by R&D firm e at a cost of η units of the final good and Rne (t) is the flow of
resources devoted to horizontal R&D by innovator e at time t. The cost η is assumed
to be symmetric, with η ≡ η(t) = φN(t)β , where φ and β are positive constants (e.g.,
Evans, Honkapohja, and Romer, 1998; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, ch. 6). That is,
the cost of setting up a new variety (cost of horizontal entry) is increasing in the number
of existing varieties, N ; the scale of the economy induces a negative externality in the
form of a barrier to entry because it becomes costlier to introduce new varieties in large
growing economies. Then, Rn =
∑
eRne and
.
N(t) =
∑
e
.
N e(t), implying
Rn(t) = η(t) · N˙(t) (17)
Next, consider the average of the quality index for the existing varieties
µq(t) =
ˆ N(t)
0
q(ω, t)
N(t)
dω =
Q(t)
N(t)
. (18)
We assume that the horizontal innovator enters with quality level mµq(t), where m is a
positive constant; i.e., there is a spillover from incumbents to potential entrants. However,
while, e.g., Howitt (1999) and Thompson (2001) consider m = 1, we posit m ∈ (0, 1).
The fact that firms enter with a scaled-down version of the average quality level of
existing varieties, for instance due to imperfect imitation of incumbents' technology (e.g.,
Luttmer, 2007; Poschke, 2009),14implies that firms entering along the horizontal margin
are less efficient, and thus smaller (see (6)), than the incumbent average size across
industries. In contrast, as explained above, firms entering along the vertical margin are
more efficient, and thus larger, than the incumbent in a given industry. Indeed, empirical
evidence suggests that there is significant variation in the relative efficiency of new firms
(e.g., Audretsch, 1995; Geroski, 1995). As the horizontal innovator's monopoly power
will be also terminated by the arrival of a successful vertical innovator in the future,
14As noted by Poschke (2009), one possible explanation is that potential entrants cannot copy incumbents
perfectly due to tacitness of knowledge embodied in these firms. However, the entry mechanism can be
interpreted in other ways besides imitation. For instance, one can consider incumbents' productivity
as an indicator of knowledge in the economy. If entrants can draw on that, either as a spillover or
because it is embodied in the production facilities they acquire upon entry, then they benefit from
incumbents' productivity.
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the benefits from entry are given by V (µq) = µpi(t)
´∞
t e
− ´ st [r(ν)+I(µq(ν))]dνds, where
µpi = p˜iLmµq (see (7)). Analogously to V (j) in (14), we then have
V (µq) =
µpi(t)
r + I(µq)
. (19)
The free-entry condition is N˙ · V (µq) = Rn, which simplifies to
V (µq) = η(t). (20)
Substituting (19) into (20), yields the arbitrage equation facing a horizontal innovator
r + I =
µpi(t)
η (t)
. (21)
Finally, before deciding which type of R&D to perform, the potential entrant should
evaluate the best type of entry. At the margin, she/he should be indifferent between
the two types, implying there is a consistency condition between them. If we equate the
effective rate of return r+ I for both types of entry by considering (16) and (21), we get
the arbitrage condition
µq(t) =
Q (t)
N (t)
=
η (t)
m · ζ · L. (22)
This condition is one of the key ingredients of the model. It equates the cost of the
horizontal, η, to the average cost of vertical R&D, mµqζL.
3 Balanced-growth path
The aggregate financial wealth held by all households is a(t) =
´ N(t)
0 V (ω, t)dω, which,
from the arbitrage condition between vertical and horizontal entry, yields a(t) = η(t) ·
N(t). Taking time derivatives and comparing with (2), we get an expression for the
aggregate flow budget constraint which is equivalent to the product market equilibrium
condition (see Gil, Brito, and Afonso, 2010)
Y (t) = C(t) +X(t) +Rv(t) +Rn(t). (23)
The dynamic general equilibrium is defined by the allocation {X(ω, t), ω ∈ [0, N(t)],
t ≥ 0}, by the prices {p(ω, t), ω ∈ [0, N(t)], t ≥ 0} and by the aggregate paths {C(t), N(t),
Q(t), I(t), r(t), t ≥ 0}, such that: (i) consumers, final-good firms and intermediate-good
firms solve their problems; (ii) vertical, horizontal and consistency free-entry conditions
are met; and (iii) markets clear.
We now derive and characterise the BGP. Let gy ≡ y˙/y represent the growth rate of
variable y(t). Along the BGP, the aggregate resource constraint (23) is satisfied with
Y , X, C, Rv and Rn growing at the same constant rate. By considering (8) and by
time-differentiating (22) with η(t) = φN(t)β , the following necessary conditions for the
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existence of a BGP are derived: (i) gC = gQ = g; (ii) gI = 0; and (iii) gQ/gN = (β + 1),
gN 6= 0. Observe that g is the long-run aggregate growth rate and that gQ and gN are
monotonically related.
If we assume that the number of industries, N , is large enough to treat Q as time-
differentiable and non-stochastic, then we can time-differentiate (18) to get Q˙(t) =´ N(t)
0 q˙(ω, t)dω + q(N, t)N˙(t). After some algebraic manipulation of the latter, we can
write, for I > 0,
gQ = I ·
(
λ
α
1−α − 1
)
+ gN . (24)
Next, solve (3) with respect to r and note that, along the BGP, gC = gQ = g, to get
r = ρ+ θg. The latter, combined with g = (β + 1) · gN , (24) and (16), yields
g =
µ (β + 1)
(
λ
α
1−α − 1
)
(β + 1)
(
λ
α
1−α − 1
)
+ β/θ
. (25)
gN =
µ
(
λ
α
1−α − 1
)
(β + 1)
(
λ
α
1−α − 1
)
+ β/θ
, (26)
I =
µ · β
(β + 1)
(
λ
α
1−α − 1
)
+ β/θ
, (27)
where µ ≡ (p˜i/ζ − ρ) /θ. Observe that lim
β→∞
g = gno−entry and that g, gN , I > 0 require
µ > 0. Since, from (3), g = gC = (r − ρ) /θ, then r > ρ must occur; this condition
also guarantees gN > 0.15 Thus, under a sufficiently productive technology, our model
predicts a BGP with constant positive g and gN , where the former exceeds the latter by
an amount corresponding to the growth of intermediate-good quality, driven by vertical
innovation; to verify this, just check (24) and solve to get Q˙/Q− N˙/N = I
(
λ
α
1−α − 1
)
,
which is positive if I > 0. This implies that the consumption growth rate equals the
growth rate of the number of varieties plus the growth rate of intermediate-good quality,
in line with the view that industrial growth proceeds both along an intensive and an
extensive margin (e.g., Howitt, 1999; Peretto and Connolly, 2007).
The number of firms along the BGP is also of interest. Given (22) and our assumption
of η(t) = φN(t)β , we find
15Also, considering a(t) = η(t) ·N(t) and (22), we re-write the transversality condition as
lim
t→∞
e−ρtC(t)−θζ · L ·Q(t) = lim
t→∞
e−ρt
(
C(t)
Q(t)
)−θ
ζ · L ·
(
Qˆegt
)1−θ
= 0 (28)
where Q = Qˆegt and Qˆ denotes detrended Q. Thus, the transversality condition implies ρ > (1−θ)g;
i.e., r > g, since g = (r − ρ) /θ. This condition also guarantees that attainable utility is bounded,
i.e., the integral (1) converges to infinity.
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N =
(
m · ζ · L
φ
·Q
) 1
β+1
(29)
Observe that m and φ have no growth effects, i.e., no impact on the BGP values of the
growth rates, g and gN , and the Poisson rate, I (see (25)-(27)), but have a level effect,
by influencing the number of firms, N , along the BGP.
4 Firm size distribution
This section is concerned with the properties of the firm size distribution (FSD) in the
intermediate-good sector that results from the interaction between the expanding variety
and the quality-ladder mechanism along the BGP, bearing in mind that both the rate
of variety expansion, gN , and the Poisson (quality-ladders) rate, I, are constant across
industries and over time (see (26) and (27)).
With firm size measured as production (or sales) per firm, X(ω, t), equation (6) then
implies that size is proportional to the quality index q(ω, t) = q(j) ≡ λ α1−α j(ω,t). On
the other hand, recall that the intermediate-good sector consists of a continuum N of
industries, each one comprising a monopolist that will eventually be replaced by a new
successful innovator in the vertical direction. Due to the assumption of perfect spillovers
from incumbents to entrants in vertical R&D, firms in each existing industry enter at a
size proportional to q(j+1), i.e., immediately above the size, proportional to q(j), of the
incumbent they have just replaced. Therefore, in order to derive the FSD, we will keep
track of an arbitrary j corresponding to a monopolist with quality index q(j) in a given
industry ω, irrespective of the fact that the monopolist's identity is changing over time.
4.1 Firm size distribution of a given cohort
First, we consider the FSD of a given cohort c of firms, i.e., of the measure of firms
that enter at time t = tc and become monopolists in new industries indexed by ωc ∈
]Ntc−, Ntc ], where  > 0 is the time span between consecutive cohorts and Nt = 0 if
t < 0. Under continuous time, and since gN = N˙/N is an instantaneous growth rate,
then lim→0 (Ntc −Ntc−) / = NgN , which is positive provided N and gN are positive.
As an initial condition, we assume that j = jc ≥ 0 for all industries ωc at t = tc. Then
(6) implies that all of these industry monopolists start off with the same size at time
t = tc. Since the same vertical innovation rate I prevails in all industries and is constant
over time, the distribution of an arbitrary j is Poisson with parameter I(t − tc). The
mean of this distribution is I(t− tc) and the variance is also I(t− tc), so both the mean
and the variance of j increase over t.
A well-known property of the Poisson distribution with parameter µ is that it converges
to a normal distribution with mean µ and variance µ as µ converges to infinity. Thus, for
sufficiently large t − tc, the distribution of j becomes approximately normal with mean
I(t− tc) and variance I(t− tc). Now, equation (6) implies that lnX = lnB + k · j, where
B ≡ Lα 21−α > 0 and k ≡ [α/(1− α)] lnλ > 0 are constants. Then, lnX is approximately
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normally distributed with mean lnB + kI(t − tc) and variance k2I(t − tc). Thus, the
distribution of firm size X is approximately lognormal when t − tc is large. A direct
corollary is that, as regards a given cohort of firms, both the average and the variance of
size increase monotonically over time.
This result allows us to accommodate the important evidence reported by Cabral
and Mata (2003) and Cabral (2007), according to which the FSD of a given cohort is
significantly right-skewed at birth  in our case, corresponding to a Poisson distribution
of log size  but evolving over time toward a normal distribution for log size (i.e., a
lognormal for size).
4.2 Total firm size distribution
4.2.1 Derivation
Now, we focus on the total FSD, i.e., the FSD when the entire population of firms is
considered. We show that the FSD is an overlapping mixture of Poisson distributions
which is systematically more right skewed and exhibits a fatter upper tail than the normal
distribution for log size.
Consider again a given cohort of firms, born at time tc as monopolists in new industries
indexed by ωc ∈ ]Ntc−, Ntc ]. For ease of exposition and without loss of generality, let us
assume  = 1 such that the measure of a given cohort can be represented by the discrete
increment ∆tc = Ntc − Ntc−1, where c, t ∈ N. Moreover, recall that µqt denotes the
average of the quality index q ≡ λ α1−α j at time t and µjt the average of the corresponding
quality level j. Also, let
z ≡ ln q = k · j, k ≡ [α/(1− α)] lnλ. (30)
In order to derive the distribution of z in (30), we heuristically analyse the evolution
of the successive cohorts over time, which can then be described by the following steps:
1. At instant tc = 0, cohort c = 0 is born, such that ∆0 = N0, µj0 = 0, µq0 = 1, and:
a) The quality level of the firms belonging to the cohort c = 0 (∆0) evolves
following Po(It) + µj0 over [0, t[;
b) The average quality index for all pre-existent cohorts of firms at t = 1 (∆0) is
given by
µq1 = λ
α
1−α (I+µj0 ) = λ
α
1−α I .
2. At instant tc = 1, cohort c = 1 is born, such that N1 = N0egN , ∆1 = N1 −N0 =
N0(egN − 1), µq1 = λ
α
1−α (I+µj0 ) = λ
α
1−α I , and:
a) The quality level of the firms belonging to the cohort c = 1 (∆1) evolves
following Po(I(t − 1)) + µj1 over [1, t[, such that µj1 solves λ
α
1−αµj1 = 1 +
m(µq1 − 1).16 Thus, µj1 = ln (1 +m(µq1 − 1)) /k, m ∈ (0, 1);
16Observe that 1 + m(µq − 1) ≈ mµq for µq large enough, where m ∈ (0, 1) denotes the degree of
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b) The average quality index for all pre-existing cohorts of firms at t = 2 (∆0 +
∆1) is given by
µq2 =
∆0λ
α
1−α (2I+µj0 ) + ∆1λ
α
1−α (I+µj1 )
N1
=
= λ
α
1−α Ie−gN
(
µq1 + (e
gN − 1)λ α1−αµj1
)
.
3. At instant tc = 2, cohort c = 2 is born, such that N2 = N0e2gN = N1egN , ∆2 =
N2 −N1 = N1(egN − 1), µq2 = λ
α
1−α Ie−gN
(
µq1 + (e
gN − 1)λ α1−αµj1
)
, and:
a) The quality level of the firms belonging to the cohort c = 2 (∆2 ) evolves
following Po(I(t − 2)) + µj2 over [2, t[, such that µj2 solves λ
α
1−αµj2 = 1 +
m(µq2 − 1). Thus, = µj2 ln (1 +m(µq2 − 1)) /k;
b) The average quality index for all pre-existing cohorts of firms at t = 3 (∆0 +
∆1 + ∆2) is given by
µq3 =
∆0λ
α
1−α (3I+µj0 ) + ∆1λ
α
1−α (2I+µj1 ) + ∆2λ
α
1−α (I+µj2 )
N2
=
= λ
α
1−α Ie−gN
(
µq2 + (e
gN − 1)λ α1−αµj2
)
.
4. Finally, at instant tc = t−1, cohort c = t−1 is born, such thatNt−1 = N0e(t−1)gN =
Nt−2egN ,∆t−1 = Nt−1 −Nt−2 = Nt−2(egN − 1), and:
a) The quality level of the firms belonging to the cohort c = t− 1 (∆t−1) evolves
following Po(I(t − tc)) + µjt−1 over [tc, t[, such that µjt−1 solves λ
α
1−αµjt−1 =
1 +m(µqt−1 − 1), which implies µjt−1 = ln
(
1 +m(µqt−1 − 1)
)
/k;
b) The average quality index for all pre-existing cohorts of firms at t (∆0 + ∆1 +
...+ ∆t−1) is given by
µqt = λ
α
1−α Ie−gN
(
µqt−1 + (e
gN − 1)λ α1−αµjt−1
)
, t > 2.
Then, at instant t ≥ 1, the distribution of z is a mixture of overlapping Poisson
distributions with the following cumulative distribution function (cdf)
Ft(z) =
t∑
i=0
∆i
Nt
FPo(I(t−i)+µji )(z/k) =
t∑
i=0
∆i
N0egN t
FPo(I(t−i))(u), (31)
imperfect imitation by horizontal entrants (see Subsection 2.3). However, since 1 + m(µq − 1) > 1
provided µq ≥ 1, we can compute ln (1 +m(µq − 1)) as a positive number for any arbitrarily small
(non-negative) value of m and µq. This is not the case for ln (mµq), because mµq may take values
below unity.
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where u = (z − ln(1 +m(µqi − 1))) /k, Nt = N0egN t, ∆0 = N0, ∆i = N0 (egN − 1) egN (i−1)
for i ≥ 1, and FPo(I(t−i)) (u) denotes the cdf of the Poisson distribution with parameter
I (t− i) evaluated at u.
The distribution in (31) reflects the systematic horizontal entry along the BGP. As one
can see, the total FSD is a direct function of the technological parameters α, λ (through
k) and m, and an indirect function of the remaining structural parameters of the model,
through their influence on the endogenous variables gN and I (see (26) and (27)). In
contrast, the distribution does not depend on the size of the first cohort, N0, which is
predetermined in the model.
Moreover, considering that R&D expenditures per firm are also proportional to the
quality index q(j) ≡ λ α1−α j(ω,t) (to see this, solve (13) in order to Rv), we conclude that
the distribution of R&D expenditure is also given by (31). Then, R&D intensity (defined
by the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales) is constant across firms, which implies that
the model predicts R&D intensity is independent of firm size. This matches one of the
stylised facts that have emerged from recent empirical studies using firm-level data (see
Klette and Kortum, 2004, and also Segerstrom, 2007).
4.2.2 Properties
The sth moment of the variable z, with cdf in (31), is given by
µ(s)z = E (z
s) =
∑
z=ln(1+m(µqi−1))+ku,u=0,1,2,...z
sft(z) =
=
∞∑
u=0
{
(ln(1 +m(µqi − 1)) + ku)s
t∑
i=0
∆i
Nt
fPo(I(t−i))(u)
}
=
=
∞∑
u=0
{
(ln(1 +m(µqi − 1)) + ku)s
t∑
i=0
∆i
N0egN t
e−I(t−i) (I(t− i))u
u!
}
, (32)
where s = 0, 1, 2, ..., ft(z) is the probability function of log size z, and fPo(I(t−i))(u) is
the probability function of the Poisson distribution with parameter I (t− i) evaluated at
u. Since it is not possible to obtain an analytical expression of the sum of the series in
(32), we proceed with our analysis by computing approximate numerical results.
To do so, we calibrate the model with the following baseline parameter values: β = 2.4,
φ = 1, ζ = 0.9, λ = 2.5, ρ = 0.02, θ = 1.5, α = 0.4, L = 1, m = 0.4. Given that along
the BGP gQ− gN = βgN , the value for β follows from the ratio between the growth rate
of the average firm size and the growth rate of the number of firms we have found in
the empirical data.17 The value for m follows from the empirical evidence reported by
Geroski (1995), according to which the average size of entrants ranges between 33 and
50 percent of the average size of incumbents; thus, we chose roughly the mid-point value
for m. The values for λ, θ, ρ and α were set in line with previous work on growth and
guided either by empirical findings or by theoretical specification, while the normalisation
17The data concerns 23 European countries in the period 1995-2005 and is available from the Eurostat
on-line database (link at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).
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of L to unity at every t implies that all aggregate magnitudes can be interpreted as per
capita magnitudes. The values of the remaining parameters were chosen in order to
calibrate the BGP aggregate growth rate around 3.5 percent/year, corresponding to the
average growth rate of World GDP in 1992-2007. The implied values for gN and I are,
respectively, 1.0 and 2.9 percent/year.
In Table 1 and Figure 1, we characterise the FSD by considering the probability func-
tion of log size ft(z) for an increasing number of cohorts over time, while we let the
parameters of the model take their baseline values throughout the analysis.18 The skew-
ness and the tail-weight coefficients compare the FSD, in (31), with a normal distribution
of log size with the same average and variance.19The interpretation of their values is as
follows: if the Fisher skewness coefficient is above (below) zero, then the FSD is right
(left) skewed (this coefficient for the normal distribution is zero); if the upper (lower)
tail coefficient is above (below) unity, the FSD has an upper (lower) tail heavier than the
upper (lower) tail of the normal distribution. As already explained, since we are only
able to compute approximate numerical results, small variations in the coefficients, espe-
cially if they do not show persistence in direction (i.e., upwards or downwards), should
be interpreted with due caution. The same applies to changes in the average, E(z), in
the variance, V (z), and thus in the variation coefficient, γz =
√
V (z)/E(z).
Firstly, we find that both the average and the variance of (log) size are not constant
over time. The average increases monotonically, as would be expected since sales per
firm, X(ω, t), and hence lnX(ω, t), are propelled by the endogenous growth of quality
(see (6)), which is positive along the BGP. In turn, the variance displays an inverted-U
pattern over time: a rapid increase in the variance, when the number of cohorts is still
relatively small, is followed by a gradual decrease over time, after the number of cohorts
rises above a certain threshold. This non-monotonic behaviour reflects the stabilising
effect of the number of cohorts on the variance. That is, as shown in Subsection 4.1, for
a given cohort of firms, both the average and the variance of size increase monotonically
over time (see also Table 2 and Figure 2). The fact that the number of cohorts increases
exponentially at rate gN , combined with size upon horizontal entry rising over time
in tandem with average size of existing firms due to the (imperfect) spillovers from
incumbents to entrants, implies that a stabilisation/downward trend in the dispersion
of firm size will eventually set in when the entire population of firms is considered.20As
18However, extensive sensitivity analysis has shown that the results presented hereafter are robust, in
qualitative terms, to changes in the underlying parameters. See Section 5.
19We consider the Fisher skewness coefficient of a distribution F , which is given by µ3/µ
3
2, where µs
denotes the s-th central moment of F . As regards the tail weight, we consider modified versions
of the tail-weight coefficient defined in Hoaglin, Mosteller, and Tukey (1983). Thus, the right-tail
weight is given by
(
F−1(0.99)−F−1(0.5)
F−1(0.75)−F−1(0.5)
)(
Φ−1(0.99)−Φ−1(0.5)
Φ−1(0.75)−Φ−1(0.5)
)−1
and the left-tail weight is given by(
F−1(0.5)−F−1(0.01)
F−1(0.5)−F−1(0.25)
)(
Φ−1(0.5)−Φ−1(0.01)
Φ−1(0.5)−Φ−1(0.25)
)−1
, where F−1 and Φ−1 denote the inverse cdf of F and of
the standard Normal, Φ, respectively.
20A similar result follows if, instead of considering that a given cohort of entrants introduces new varieties
with the quality level concentrated at a given point of mass (given bym times the average quality level
of extant varieties), we assume that the quality level of those new varieties follows a non-degenerate
distribution, provided this distribution has a smaller variance than the distribution of the quality
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t = 100 t = 250 t = 500 t = 750 t = 1000 t = 1500
E(z) 1.4399 3.1288 5.9660 8.8671 11.7786 17.6038
V (z) 0.7916 1.3266 1.4343 1.4218 1.4182 1.4175
Variation coeff. 0.6179 0.3681 0.2007 0.1345 0.1011 0.0676
Skewness coeff. 0.8358 1.4826 1.7482 1.7694 1.7676 1.7659
Upper-tail weight coeff. 1.2850 1.4089 1.6824 1.6649 1.6653 1.6655
Lower-tail weight coeff.  0.8912 0.9854 0.9976 0.9994 0.9999
Table 1: The total FSD properties for a different number of cohorts/periods of time
(computation with the baseline parameter values).
t = 100 t = 250 t = 500 t = 750 t = 1000 t = 1500
E(z) 2.9060 7.2650 14.5300 21.7950 29.0600 43.5900
V (z) 2.9060 7.2650 14.5300 21.7950 29.0600 43.5900
Variation coeff. 0.4493 0.2260 0.1344 0.0991 0.0799 0.0589
Skewness coeff. 0.5866 0.3710 0.2623 0.2142 0.1855 0.1515
Upper-tail weight coeff. 1.0978 1.0847 1.0641 1.0520 1.0490 1.0380
Lower-tail weight coeff.  0.8880 0.9138 0.9386 0.9456 0.9563
Table 2: The properties of the FSD of a given cohort of firms over time (computation
with the baseline parameter values).
regards empirical evidence, an upward trend in average sales per firm and a downward
trend in the variance of sales per firm over the long run are reported by, respectively,
Jovanovic (1993) and Castro and Clementi (2009).
Secondly, the skewness and the upper-tail weight coefficients are systematically above
zero and one, respectively, i.e., the skewness is larger and the upper tail is fatter than
those observed with the normal distribution of log size, to which the FSD of a single
cohort converges. Moreover, the coefficients become roughly stable for a sufficiently large
number of cohorts (in the numerical exercise presented in Table 1, for around t > 500),
with a very slow decrease of the skewness and a very slow increase of the upper-tail weight
afterwards. The mechanism behind these results is similar to the one that explains
the effect of the number of cohorts on the variance, as described above.21 Thus, our
theoretical predictions qualitatively address the evidence for total FSD in, e.g., Cabral
and Mata (2003) and Bottazzi, Cefis, Dosi, and Secchi (2007), as regards skewness, and in
Gaffeo, Gallegati, and Palestrini (2003) and Growiec, Pammolli, Riccaboni, and Stanley
(2008), as regards upper-tail weight. On the other hand, the lower tail is less heavy than
the normal lower tail for a relatively small number of cohorts, but approaches the tail
level of the extant varieties.
21At a given instant of time, due to the co-existence of different cohorts, not all firms have had the same
time to grow, while the population of firms itself continuously grows. Such behaviour of firm entry
and growth resembles the well-known Yule process, whose limiting distribution exhibits a heavy upper
tail and was used by Simon (1955) as a model for various skewed empirical distributions, including
the city size distribution (see de Wit, 2005).
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Figure 1: The total FSD for a different number of cohorts/periods of time (in log size).
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Figure 2: The FSD of a given cohort over time (in log size).
20
Figure 3: Log-log plot of the tail cdf of size, 1 − F (q), for a different number of co-
horts/periods of time.
21
weight of the normal distribution over time.
Finally, by considering (31) with support changed from z to q ≡ ez, we obtain the
cdf of size, Ft(q). Then, we are also able to show that an (inverse) power law scaling
behaviour emerges in the upper tail as the number of cohorts increases. Figure 3 depicts
the tail cdf 1−F (q) in a log-log scale, with an OLS regression line that informs us on the
goodness of fit to a power law distribution. The slope of the regression line corresponds
(in modulus) to the estimate of the power law coefficient.22For the baseline parameters,
the estimates of the power-law coefficient stabilise at 0.84, which is within the range of
empirical estimates obtained by Gaffeo, Gallegati, and Palestrini (2003) when firm size
is measured by sales. However, as further noted in Section 5, for any given number of
cohorts, our estimates are somewhat sensitive to shifts in the parameters of the model.
The concavity of the tail cdf in the log-log scale also seems to change somewhat, despite
the fact that the goodness of fit, measured by the R2 (square of the correlation coefficient)
remains very high.
To sum up, a rather stable FSD arises with respect to the skewness and the upper-tail
behaviour, which is in accord with the empirical properties of the FSD emphasised in the
literature when the entire population of firms is considered. Nevertheless, since not all
the moments of the distribution are stationary, not even asymptotically, then the total
FSD is not stationary. Furthermore, the fact that the coefficient of variation decreases
monotonically over time makes it clear that the FSD is not stationary even if we consider
normalised firm sizes  i.e., firm sizes divided by the average firm size.
5 Comparative statics and policy implications for growth
and market structure
Since the properties of the FSD cannot be derived analytically, a sensitivity analysis was
conducted in order to access the robustness of our results. We tested for a wide range of
parameter values and concluded that the skewness and the upper-tail weight coefficients
presented in Table 1, whose values are systematically above zero and one, respectively,
are robust to changes in all parameters (for any given number of cohorts roughly above
100). That is,we always obtain a FSD that is right-skewed and has a fatter upper tail
than the normal of log size. In contrast, the weight of the lower tail is sensitive to changes
in β (positive relationship), m (positive relationship) and ζ (negative relationship), such
that lower-tail weight coefficient oscillates between values below and above unity (see
numerical illustration in Table 3). Also, the slope and the concavity of the distribution
in the log-log scale are somewhat sensitive to changes in the parameters of the model
(see Figure 5).23
22In the empirical literature, the goodness of fit of the data to a power law (strict Pareto) F (x) =
1−( a
x
)p
, x ≥ a, p > 0, is usually determined by means of the OLS regression ln(1−F (x)) = b−p lnx,
b = p lna, where x stands for firm size and F is the corresponding empirical cdf. In our case, we fit
the line ln(1 − F (x)) = b − p lnx, where x ≡ q, to the log-log plot of the theoretical tail of the cdf
generated by (31) with support changed from z to q.
23The impact on the concavity is especially clear as regards changes in the preferences parameters, ρ
and θ. For the sake of space, these results are not shown in Figure 5.
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From the point of view of the policy implications of our model, the impact of changes
in the technological parameters ζ, β, m and φ is of special interest, in as much as these
changes may be induced by the government by granting R&D subsidies and/or conducting
other forms of industrial policy.24 As far as R&D subsidies are concerned, we focus on the
separate effects of those targeted at vertical R&D  which can be seen as pertaining to
process innovation and incremental product innovation  and those targeted at horizontal
R&D  pertaining to radical product innovation.The importance of analysing the impact
of R&D subsidies separated this way has been convincingly emphasised by Peretto (1998).
We explore the fact that the properties of the FSD can be directly related to the firm
dynamics arising from systematic innovative activity, in order to analyse the simultaneous
impact of policy on economic growth and market structure, characterised by the number
of firms, the average firm size and market concentration. As regards the latter, we use
the well-known Herfindahl index as a measure.25 Bearing in mind that the market share
of the incumbent in industry ω with quality level j(ω, t), measured at the aggregate level,
is given by X(j)/X = q(j)/Q, we have
H(t) =
1
N(t)
+N(t) · V
(
q(j)
Q(t)
)
=
=
1
N(t)
{
1 + (γq(t))
2
}
. (33)
where γq denotes the coefficient of variation of q ≡ λ
α
1−α j . As noted by Laincz (2009),
the expression in (33) allows us to separate two effects on concentration: the first term
captures the impact of the number of firms on concentration if all firms have equal market
shares (if this is the case, the concentration measure is 1/N , which is the minimum level
of concentration given N firms in the market), while the second term shows how the
dispersion of market shares contributes to concentration, for a given number of firms.
Concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl index, declines with a ceteris paribus
increase in Q(t), through the BGP value of N(t) (see (29)). Since Q(t) grows at the
constant rate g > 0 along the BGP, we focus on changes in concentration conditional on
Q(t).
As expected, the comparative-statics results depend upon the source of the change
in the general equilibrium. For the purpose of illustration, in Table 3 and Figure 4 we
consider four different scenarios, besides the baseline (scenario 1), each of which corre-
sponding to a deviation from the baseline value of one of the technological parameters ζ,
β, m and φ. Figure 4 depicts the probability function of log size, ft(z), for each scenario,
while Table 3 displays the properties of the distribution and the corresponding values
for the economic growth rate, g, the growth rate of the number of firms, gN , the Poisson
rate, I, the number of firms, N , and the Herfindahl index.
24We study the effect of subsidies by considering that the government budget is always balanced and
that changes in subsidies are exactly matched by changes of opposite sign in nondistortionary taxes
(e.g., lump-sum taxes on consumption).
25For a similar use of the Herfindahl index at the aggregate level, see Thompson (2001) and Laincz
(2009).
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t = 500 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
(baseline) β = 1.4 ζ = 0.4 m = 0.6 φ = 0.6
g 0.0347 0.0370 0.0671 0.0347 0.0347
gN 0.0102 0.0154 0.0197 0.0102 0.0102
I 0.0291 0.0256 0.0562 0.0291 0.0291
N 1.3537 1.5357 1.1482 1.5251 1.5731
E(z) 5.9660 3.8107 11.4054 7.0195 5.9660
V (z) 1.4342 0.9551 1.4113 1.2135 1.4342
Variation coeff. γz 0.2007 0.2565 0.1042 0.1569 0.2007
Skewness coeff. 1.7482 1.9045 1.7747 1.4884 1.7482
Upper-tail weight coeff. 1.6824 1.7034 1.6544 1.6119 1.6824
Lower-tail weight coeff. 0.9839 0.6583 1.5271 1.3177 0.9839
Variation coeff. γq 5.6378 8.7373 17.2927 4.4440 5.6378
Herfindahl index 24.2190 50.3607 261.2993 13.6053 20.8405
Table 3: Growth rates, Poisson rate, number of firms and total FSD properties under
different scenarios for selected parameters.
Figure 4: The total FSD under different scenarios for selected parameters (in log size).
The FSD for scenario 5 is the same as for scenario 1 (baseline).
24
Figure 5: Log-log plot of the tail cdf of size, 1− F (q), for selected parameters. The tail
cdf for scenario 5 is the same as for scenario 1 (baseline).
Let us consider first a subsidy to vertical R&D, which implies a decrease in the fixed
flow cost of vertical entry, ζ. This induces a reduction in the number of firms, N , for a
given Q, such that the initial decrease in ζ is matched by an increase in average quality
(see (22)). The reduction in ζ also increases the effective rate of return I + r (see (16)),
which secures the larger resources allocated to investment (vertical and horizontal R&D)
at the expense of present consumption (and hence granting a larger consumption growth
 see the impact of ζ on (3)). This, in turn, implies an increase in both the growth rate of
the number of firms, gN , and the Poisson arrival rate, I, from which follows an increase
in average firm size E(z) and a decrease in the coefficient of variation γz; however, in our
numerical illustration, the latter translates into an increase in the coefficient of variation
γq.
26 Thus, concentration measured by (33) increases through both the number and the
dispersion component, i.e., subsidies to vertical R&D stretch the FSD such that firm sizes
are more spread out with fewer firms. Overall, there is a positive impact on economic
growth, g, on concentration and on average firm size. Observe that the impact of ζ on
26Given that q ≡ ez, the change of support from z to q brings about an increase in the variance that
exceeds the increase in the average of the FSD (indeed, as shown in Table 3, γz < 1 while γq > 1).
Since V (z) = E(z2) − (E(z))2 and V (q) = E(e2z) − (E(ez))2, this behaviour must be due to the
fact that the effect of the change of support on the second moment of the distribution dominates the
effect on (the quadratic of) the first moment. If this dominance is strong enough, then a shift in a
given parameter with respect to the baseline that affects the coefficient of variation may imply that
γz/γ
base
z < 1 and γq/γ
base
q > 1, where γ
base denotes the coefficient of variation corresponding to the
baseline scenario. This is the case as regards the change in ζ analysed in Table 3.
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the FSD, and hence on γq, is only indirect through the effect of ζ on gN and I.
In contrast, by lowering the fixed flow cost of horizontal entry, φ, a subsidy to horizontal
R&D has level effects only: it increases the number of firms, such that the initial decrease
in φ is matched by a decrease in average quality; however, since there is no impact of
φ on the effective rate of return, both vertical and horizontal R&D are left unchanged
(a higher number of firms with a smaller φ implies that the same amount of horizontal
R&D sustains a given growth rate of the number of firms) and hence there is no effect on
growth along either the vertical or the horizontal margin. Thereby, there is no impact on
average firm size (despite the increase in the number of firms) and on the coefficient of
variation (both γz and γq). That is, there is no change in the FSD, and thus concentration
decreases only through the number component. Overall, there is no impact on either
economic growth or average firm size, but a negative impact on concentration.
An industrial policy aimed at reducing the negative externality induced by the number
of existing varieties (barrier to horizontal entry) acts by decreasing the elasticity of the
horizontal entry cost, β. This implies an increase in the number of firms, in a similar
fashion to a subsidy to horizontal R&D, while also having no impact on the effective rate
of return. However, because a change in β alters the balance between the growth rate of
the number of firms and the growth rate of quality (recall, from the necessary conditions
for the existence of a BGP, that gQ/gN = (β + 1)), there will be a shift of resources
from vertical R&D to horizontal R&D, and hence an increase in the growth rate of the
number of firms and decrease in the Poisson arrival rate. A fall in average firm size and an
increase in the coefficient of variation (both γz and γq) then follow. Although the final
result on concentration is a priori ambiguous, our numerical results show an increase in
concentration as the number component is dominated by the dispersion component in
(33). Overall, there is a positive impact on economic growth and on concentration, and
a negative impact on average firm size. Observe that, similarly to ζ, the impact of β on
the FSD is only indirect, through the effect of β on gN and I.
On the other side of the coin, an industrial policy aimed at promoting the positive
spillovers from incumbents to horizontal entrants, by increasing the degree of imperfect
imitation by horizontal entrants, m, raises the number of firms while having no impact
on the effective rate of return. Since there is also no effect on the relationship between
the growth rate of the number of firms and the growth rate of quality, then a change
in m has only level effects, similarly to a subsidy to horizontal R&D. However, m has a
direct impact on the FSD, such that the average firm size increases (despite the increase
in the number of firms) and the coefficient of variation (both γz and γq) decreases. Thus,
concentration falls through both the number and the dispersion component. Overall, the
impact is null on economic growth, negative on concentration and positive on average
firm size.
Finally, policy intervention that decreases ζ or increasesm may also induce a FSD with
a fat lower tail, as shown in Table 3. Fat lower tails have been apparently overlooked by
the literature on firm size but have been reported by empirical studies on income and
city size distributions (see Reed, 2002, 2003).
To sum up, the effect of R&D subsidies and targeted industrial policies is either: (i)
growth- and concentration-enhancing or (ii) growth-neutral and concentration-reducing.
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In particular, subsidies to vertical R&D belong to (i), while subsidies to horizontal R&D
fit into (ii). Comparing with the literature, Laincz (2009), who considers subsidies to
R&D only along the vertical direction, also obtains a positive relationship between growth
and concentration as in (i). In that paper, however, concentration is computed from a
cross-section distribution of market structures, i.e., a distribution of firm sizes as mea-
sured by market shares within each industry, taken across all industries. In contrast,
Peretto (1998) considers both vertical and horizontal R&D but his measure of concen-
tration is the reciprocal of the number of firms (i.e., equivalent to the first term in (33)),
since the author confines his analysis to an equilibrium which is symmetric with respect
to firm size. Peretto's model predicts a positive relationship between growth and concen-
tration as follows: subsidies to vertical R&D are growth- and concentration-enhancing,
while subsidies to horizontal R&D are growth- and concentration-reducing.
Thus, we extend Laincz's and Peretto's results as regards the effect of subsidies to
vertical R&D on concentration and growth to a setup with a non-degenerate FSD that
exhibits the desired (qualitative) empirical properties. The same applies to Peretto's
results as regards the effect of subsidies to horizontal R&D on concentration, while our
prediction of a null impact of this type of subsidies on growth directly reflects the lack
of relationship between growth and the flow fixed entry cost φ. Intuitively, the latter
stems from the dominant effect exerted by the vertical-innovation mechanism over the
horizontal-entry dynamics. Indeed, given the postulated horizontal entry technology and
the lab-equipment R&D specification,27a BGP with positive (net) entry occurs ultimately
because entrants expect incumbency value to grow propelled by quality-enhancing R&D.
In contrast, Peretto (1998) assumes that R&D is knowledge-driven. In this case, the
choice between vertical and horizontal R&D implies a division of labour between the
two types of R&D. Since the total labour level is determined exogenously, horizontal
entry occurs at the same rate as population growth along the BGP. Under this framework,
a subsidy to horizontal R&D competes away scarce resources from vertical R&D and
ultimately implies a fall in the growth rate.
However, one cannot conclude from the results described above that the relationship
between concentration and growth is only either positive or null in our model. Indeed,
it can be shown that changes in the preferences parameters ρ and θ imply a change
of growth and concentration in opposite directions (not shown in Table 3). Thus, we
confirm the ambiguity of the sign of the growth-concentration relationship emphasised
by Thompson (2001) and others (see Thompson for several references to the related
empirical literature).
Also noteworthy is the ambiguity of the sign of the relationship between economic
growth and average firm size predicted by our model (see g and E(z) in Table 3). Al-
though recent empirical work has found a positive relationship between average firm size
and growth at the aggregate level, the majority of the empirical literature still gives little
support for this view (see Pagano and Schivardi, 2003).
27Using Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991)'s terminology, the assumption that the homogeneous final
good is the R&D input means that one adopts the lab-equipment version of R&D, instead of
the knowledge-driven specification, in which labour is ultimately the only input.
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In contrast, our model predicts an unequivocal relationship between economic size,
measured by population size L, and both the number of firms and concentration: see
the positive impact of L on (26) and, thereby, the negative impact on (33) (due to the
removal of scale effects in our model, L has no impact on the FSD and hence on γq). This
matches one of the robust stylised facts that emerges from international comparisons of
manufacturing industrial structures: large countries tend to have a larger number of firms
and lower concentration rates than small countries (see, e.g., Sherer and Ross, 1990). One
of the most important theoretical results in Peretto (1998) makes a similar prediction,
which we herein extend to a framework where the FSD is non-degenerate.
6 Concluding remarks
With this paper, our goal has been to show how a simple model of endogenous growth
with simultaneous vertical and horizontal R&D is able to account for several observed
features of the FSD. We thereby establish a connection between endogenous growth
theory and findings from firm-level studies of firm dynamics and innovation.
In particular, we have derived a highly-skewed fat-tailed FSD within a model where the
only source of firm heterogeneity is the Poisson process of quality ladders (vertical R&D).
In contrast, Thompson (2001) and Klette and Kortum (2004) combine the Poisson process
with other stochastic features in order to introduce other dimensions of (exogenous) firm
heterogeneity in their models. Our theoretical results qualitatively match the empirical
evidence found both for the cohort and the total distribution, and still not addressed by
the literature on endogenous growth and firm dynamics.
The simplicity of our stochastic structure, however, comes at the expense of empirically
adequate predictions relating to firm age and exit dynamics. In particular, future work
should seek to extend the present model in order to include elements that capture (i) exit
probabilities that are decreasing in firm size and age,28 and (ii) growth rates of size (both
in terms of expected value and variance) decreasing in size and age among surviving firms,
which are well-known empirical features of firm dynamics (see, e.g., Klette and Kortum,
2004).
Another possible extension of our model would be to allow both incumbents and en-
trants to perform R&D (e.g., Segerstrom, 2007), although this would imply a more
complicated setup. This feature may be essential for further evaluating the impact of
R&D subsidies, which, as emphasised by Mansfield (1986), are in reality often explicitly
designed to act on the marginal expenditures of incumbents that do R&D.
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